Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power by Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong
A Dynamic Theory of Parliamentary Democracy1
David P. Baron2 Daniel Diermeier3 Pohan Fong4
First Version: February, 2007
This Version: July 1, 2009
1Formerly "Policy Dynamics and Ine¢ ciency in a Parliamentary Democracy with Pro-
portional Representation." We thank Steve Coate and seminar participants at the CIFAR-
IOG Conference, the NBER Summer Institute, Princeton University and Washington Uni-
versity in St. Louis for comments and suggestions. All errors are our own.
2Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.
3Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS) and Ford Motor
Company Center for Global Citizenship, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern
University.
4Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong.Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic model of election, government formation, and legis-
lation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation in which the
policy chosen in one period becomes the status quo for the next period. The electorate
votes strategically by taking into account the likely governments that parties would
form and the policies they would choose as a function of the status quo. The status
quo thus a⁄ects both the election outcomes and the bargaining power of the parties
during government formation. A formateur party thus has incentives to strategically
position the current policy to gain an advantage in both the next election and the
subsequent bargaining over government formation and policy choice. These incentives
can give rise to centrifugal forces that result in policies that are outside the Pareto
set of the parties.
JEL Code: D7, C7, H1.
Keywords: Parliamentary democracy, proportional representation, government for-
mation, policy dynamics, lack of commitment, ine¢ ciency.1 Introduction
How political institutions a⁄ect policy choices is of central importance in the ￿eld of
political economy. Considerable progress has been made in developing comparative
models of political institutions to predict the induced policy choices.1 One persistent
obstacle in this research program has been the di¢ culty of modeling multiparty par-
liamentary systems, the most prevalent political system in Europe and some parts of
Asia. These systems typically arise out of the con￿ uence of two constitutional fea-
tures. The ￿rst is parliamentary governance; i.e., the executive is not directly elected
by the popular vote but by the legislature to whom it remains accountable. Second,
elections are usually held under proportional representation (PR); i.e., seats in the
legislature are assigned to parties proportional to their vote shares.
Parliamentary systems are rich in complex strategic incentives for both voters
and politicians. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Baron and Diermeier (2001), and
Scho￿eld and Sened (2006) study the incentives of strategic voting in single-period,
full-equilibrium models that integrate government formation, legislation, and elec-
tions.2 With proportional representation it is rare for one party to capture a majority
of seats and parties must form coalitions to govern. Because governments and their
policies are the consequence of multilateral bargaining, voters should base their vote
not on a party￿ s announced platform or policy preferences but on the policies ex-
pected to be chosen by the governing coalitions that may form once a new parliament
has been elected. A moderate supporter of a conservative party, for example, may
prefer a coalition government of the conservative party with a centrist party over a
single-party conservative government. So, in cases in which the conservative party
1See Persson and Tabellini (2000; 2003) for extensive surveys of the literature.
2For empirical evidence on the use of sophisticated voting strategies in proportional representation
systems see Cox (1997) and especially Bawn (1999).
1is close to gaining an absolute majority of seats, the voter may prefer voting for the
second preferred centrist party.
A parallel line of research has investigated how di⁄erent aspects of parliamentary
democracies provide incentives for policymakers and shape economic policy. Persson,
Roland and Tabellini (2000) compare di⁄erent political regimes and show that leg-
islative cohesion, typical of parliamentary systems (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998),
induces politicians to engage in more public goods provision, less pork barrel spending,
and more corruption compared to separation of proposal power, typical of presidential
systems. Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001) show how pro-
portional representation elections induce political parties to commit to more public
goods provision and less redistribution compared to single-member district systems.
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) examine incentives for politicians to
allocate government spending for local public goods and targeted transfers in parlia-
mentary democracies with di⁄erent electoral rules. Persson, Roland, and Tabellini
(2007) focus on the accountability problem of proportional representation elections
and extend their earlier analytical framework to address the incentives for politicians
to form political parties and for the parties to form governing coalitions.
Most studies of parliamentary systems have not considered a potentially important
incentive: Incumbent governments may strategically position the current government
policy to in￿ uence the outcome of the next election and the subsequent government
formation and policy choice. The absence of research is in part due to the di¢ culty in
formulating tractable and general models of parliamentary institutions in a dynamic
setting and is in marked contrast to the rich literature on policy dynamics in a two-
party political system.3
This paper presents a dynamic theory of representation, government formation
3For surveys of the literature see Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Drazen (2000).
2and policy choice in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation,
and investigates the implications for the e¢ ciency of policy choices. The theory
integrates the principal institutions of multiparty democracies into a full equilibrium,
two-period model. Each period begins with a proportional representation election
that determines representation and seat shares of the parties in parliament. After the
election one party is selected as the "formateur," the party with the right to propose
a coalition. Unless a party controls a majority of seats, the probability a party is
selected as formateur is proportional to the party￿ s seat share in parliament. The
formateur then forms a governing coalition with majority support in parliament and
bargains with the other coalition members over policy and the redistribution of o¢ ce-
holding bene￿ts. The model thus integrates three major institutions of a multi-party
parliamentary democracy, elections, government formation, and legislation.
We focus on a political system in which a policy is in e⁄ect until it is replaced
by a new policy. In particular, any policy chosen by the governing coalition must
defeat the policy chosen by the previous government, and it then becomes the status
quo for the next period. We show that the equilibrium policy outcome in a period
is completely determined by the status quo policy at the beginning of that period.
This allows us to study policy dynamics in multiparty democracies with strategic
voters and politicians. Since the current policy choice has consequences for the next
period, the formateur chooses a policy in the current period that trades o⁄ current
payo⁄s against potential advantages in the next election and government formation
cycle. This paper thus extends the literature of dynamic legislative bargaining by
incorporating elections into the model.4
4The literature on dynamic legislative bargaining with an endogenous status quo was initiated
by Baron (1996). For recent development, for example, see Baron and Herron (2003), Battaglini
and Coate (2007; 2008), Bowen and Zahran (2007), Fong (2006), Duggan and Kalandrakis (2007),
and Kalandrakis (2004; 2007). These papers, however, do not model elections. An exception is Cho
(2008) who studies a dynamic bargaining model with elections and a unidimensional policy space.
3A key component of our theory is lack of commitment. We assume that both
voters and political parties are farsighted and forward looking and cannot commit to
future actions. In particular, political parties cannot commit to which government
to form or which policy to choose, and voters cannot commit to a voting strategy.
Our modeling strategy is in line with Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) and Baron
and Diermeier (2001), and di⁄erent from two other common approaches that have
been taken to study proportional representation elections. The ￿rst approach as-
sumes commitment by political parties. Persson and Tabellini (1999), Lizzeri and
Persico (2001), and Pagano and Volpin (2006) take the view that elections aggregate
preferences of voters and assume that o¢ ce-motivated political parties announce and
commit to their policy platforms before an election takes place. The second approach
assumes commitment by voters. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000; 2007) take the
view that elections discipline politicians who have con￿ icts of interests with voters
and may waste public resources for their own bene￿t. In their models voters commit
to their voting strategies before policy making takes place and vote retrospectively
to punish or reward parties in the incumbent government. Our approach thus di⁄ers
from most existing models of proportional representation elections and is appropriate
given the subsequent post-election coalition bargaining.
The presence of farsighted politicians in a model with proportional representation
elections and government formation creates a new source of ine¢ ciency. This ine¢ -
ciency arises from the governing parties￿ability to strategically position the current
status quo to improve their future bargaining strength and electoral prospects.5 First,
5Strategic manipulation of policy and its welfare implication have been studied in a rich literature
on the lack of commitment. For example, see Aghion and Bolton (1990), Persson and Svensson
(1989), Tabellini and Alesina (1990) for an early development of models with two-party politics,
Besley and Coate (1998) in the citizen-candidate framework, and also Fong (2006) and Battaglini
and Coate (2007; 2008) for models of legislative bargaining. Our paper adds to this literature by
exploring a new mechanism that results from the interaction of bargaining and elections.
4parties in the governing coalition have incentives to position themselves favorably for
the bargaining over policy and o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts in the next period. They can
do so by disadvantaging the current out party in the bargaining so as to lower its
reservation value. This creates a centrifugal incentive to choose an extreme policy,
and that policy can be outside the single-period Pareto set of the parties￿preferences.
This bargaining e⁄ect is also studied by Fong (2006) in a model with ￿xed seat shares.
Second, parties have electoral incentives to obtain greater representation in par-
liament, since the likelihood of being selected as the formateur is weakly increasing
in representation. The party that is most disadvantaged by the status quo would on
average receive the least votes in the next election. This results because as a "cheap"
coalition partner the current out party would always be included in the next gov-
ernment, and some of its natural constituents have an incentive to vote for another
party to increase that party￿ s probability of being selected as formateur and forming
a government with the out party. Disadvantaging the out party in the next bargain-
ing over government formation and legislation yields an electoral advantage for the
incumbent parties, especially the formateur. With such an electoral advantage, the
current formateur expects to head the next government with a greater probability.
Hence, it has a stronger incentive to disadvantage the out party in future bargaining
so that it could extract more o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts from the out party if selected as
formateur in the next period. Conditional on the type of government formed, the
electoral e⁄ect thus ampli￿es the centrifugal force due to the bargaining e⁄ect, and
leads to more extreme and ine¢ cient policy outcomes.
One may wonder whether voters could elect a government in the ￿rst period that
would make more e¢ cient policy choices for a given initial status quo. We show that
such moderation cannot occur if the initial status quo is su¢ ciently close to the center
of voter preferences. The centrifugal force arising from the period-two election cannot
5be counterbalanced by a period-one election when the status quo is centrally located.
Policy making in our theory is coalition e¢ cient in the sense that the policy
maximizes the aggregate multi-period utility of the governing coalition, but since
the policy can be extreme, it can be strongly ine¢ cient for voters. Moreover, social
welfare measured as the average multi-period utility of voters decreases as the parties
care more about their future utilities. While centrifugal forces arise from coalition
bargaining and proportional representation elections, electoral incentives also limit
the extent of those forces and of the resulting ine¢ ciency, since a policy too extreme
can lead to an incumbent formateur losing its electoral advantage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 solves
the model by backward induction, explains its key mechanisms, and decomposes the
total e⁄ect of institutions on policy choice into a bargaining e⁄ect and an electoral
e⁄ect. Section 4 discusses normative and positive implications of the model, and the
last section concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a two-period spatial model of elections, government formation and policy
choice.6 The political system consists of a large ￿nite number N of voters, and three
political parties labeled a, b, and c. The political system selects a two-dimensional
policy x 2 <2 in each of two periods, where a period corresponds to an interelection
period.7 The policy choice in a period is made by a government formed among
those parties that have representation in parliament as determined by a proportional
representation election. A government consists of a coalition of parties with a majority
6A two-period model is su¢ cient to identify the incentives for strategic manipulation of policy
on the part of the political parties.
7Budge et al. (2001) provide evidence that political competition in post-war Europe is well
represented by a two-dimensional policy space.
6of seats in parliament.
A political party may be thought of as consisting of a leader supported by a group
of party activists with similar preferences. In period t party i 2 fa;b;cg derives utility











t = 0, and yi
t 2 < denotes the net bene￿ts transferred to i
from the other parties.8 O¢ ce-holding bene￿ts correspond to things that matter to
parties but not to voters. Such bene￿ts include patronage positions, public ￿nancing
of party activities, and perquisites of o¢ ce that will be consumed by whichever parties
form the government. Moreover, these bene￿ts can be viewed as accruing to party
activists who would vote for their party regardless of the distribution of bene￿ts, so
electoral outcomes are not a⁄ected by the distribution. In forming a government a
party can use both policy concessions and the redistribution of o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts
to secure a bargain. For example, in his study of government formation, Strom (1990)
refers to a variety of "o¢ ce and policy inducements" used in forming a government.
The redistribution of these bene￿ts can be interpreted as adjustments from the long-
tern norm regarding how parties in government divide the aggregate o¢ ce-holding
bene￿ts. An important assumption in this model is that the reallocation of o¢ ce-
holding bene￿ts can only be made among the parties in government. That is, yi
t = 0
if some party i is not in government. This implies that the parties in government can
neither extort bene￿ts from nor credibly promise to compensate the out party.9
8If yi
2 < 0; o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts are transferred from i to the other party(ies) in the government.
9It is implicitly assumed that each party is originally endowed with su¢ cient o¢ ce-holding ben-
e￿ts to satisfy any proposal made by the formateur. This assumption simpli￿es the analysis and
yields e¢ cient bargaining within coalitions. This assumption also implies that how the parties weigh
utilities derived from the policy and transfers of bene￿ts has no e⁄ect on the equilibrium. See Baron
and Diermeier (2001, p. 935) for more details and examples of o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts.







i (xt) = ￿
￿ ￿xt ￿ z
i￿ ￿2
represents party i￿ s single-period policy preferences and zi 2 <2 denotes its ideal
point.10 Parties can have preferences over ministries, but those preferences are asso-
ciated with implementing policies and hence are to be thought of as incorporated in
a party￿ s policy preferences. Parties prefer policies closer to their ideal points, but
they are more averse to policy changes the farther those changes are from their ideal
points. All parties are farsighted. They discount future utilities by ￿ 2 [0;1]: The
discount factor may be interpreted as the political patience of party leaders.11
So that no party has an inherent bargaining advantage, the ideal points of the par-
ties are assumed to be symmetrically located in the policy space.12 This speci￿cation
allows the dynamics induced by the parliamentary institutions to be isolated from
preference alignment e⁄ects. The policy space is normalized so that kzi ￿ zjk = 1

















Voters care only about policy outcomes and not the distribution of o¢ ce-holding
bene￿ts.13 A voter v is characterized by his ideal point zv 2 <2, and his single-
10Quadratic preferences are assumed for the sake of tractability. They allow a simple characteri-
zation of the equilibrium policy outcomes.
11Political patience could di⁄er across countries and also within a country depending on the tenure
and age of party leaders as well as other constitutional factors.
12This precludes the use of a unidimensional policy space.
13The aggregate o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts can be viewed as ￿xed, and whatever government is formed
will exhaust those bene￿ts. Moreover, the bene￿ts only a⁄ect party activists, whose votes will go to
their party. Hence, from a voter￿ s perspective the distribution of those bene￿ts is irrelevant to the
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Figure 1: Ideal points of parties and voters.
period preferences are represented by a utility function uv(xt) of the same form as
those of the parties. That is, the parties are formed among the electorate. Voters
are also farsighted and anticipate which party as formateur would form a particular
coalition government. In some political systems this ability to anticipate is formalized
as pre-election coalitions. Laver and Scho￿eld (1990, pp. 25, 28) give examples of pre-
election coalitions in Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.
Voters discount future utilities by ￿ 2 [0;1]; a discount factor that may di⁄er
from that of the political parties and their leaders. All voters are assumed to vote,
and their alternatives are to vote for one of the three parties. To ensure that voter
preferences do not favor a particular party or coalition, the ideal points of voters are
assumed to be uniformly distributed on a disk Z ￿fzv 2 <2 : kzv ￿ zk ￿ Lg; where
L > 1 p
3.14 Ideal points of the parties and voters are illustrated in Figure 1. The
policy z ￿ 1
3
P3
i=1 zi is the center of party and voter preferences.
Policies are continuing, so when a government is formed in period t; the status quo
14The assumption L > 1 p
3 guarantees that the ideal points of the parties are not more extreme
than those of the most extreme voters.
9qt￿1 2 <2 is the policy in place under the previous government. Similarly, the policy
chosen by the new government becomes the status quo for the following period. If a
new policy is not enacted, the status quo remains in place. In the ￿rst period there
is an initial status quo q0:
An interelection period consists of three stages. The ￿rst stage involves a parlia-
mentary election that determines the seat shares of the parties in the parliament. The
second stage involves government formation, and the third stage is legislative and in-
volves the choice of a policy by the parliament. The game has complete information,
and no player can commit to any action in future stages.
The electoral system is proportional representation with a minimum vote share





:15 The electoral rule is viewed as








of all parties are at least m; their seat shares are equal to the vote
shares. If only party i￿ s vote share is less than m, it is not represented in parliament





t: If two parties have vote shares less
than m, the third party has a seat share of 1. A parliament in which no party has
a majority is referred to as a minority parliament, whereas in a majority parliament
one party has a majority of the seats.
After an election one party is selected as the formateur. Selection is proportional to
the party￿ s seat share in parliament, unless one party has a majority of seats in which
case it is selected as the formateur.16 The formateur in period t has the opportunity
to form a government, which must be a majority coalition.17 Therefore, a government
15The upper bound on m allows all three parties to be represented in parliament even if there is
a majority party.
16Diermeier and Merlo (2004) present empirical evidence supporting a proportionality rule with
some support for an incumbency advantage.
17The model e⁄ectively precludes the formation of minority governments. For a theory that
accommodates and accounts for the occurrence of minority governments, see Diermeier and Merlo
(2000).




2. A consensus government includes all three parties, a majoritarian
government is composed of two parties, and a single-party government is formed by
a single majority party.
In forming a government the formateur is assumed to make a take-it-or-leave-it
o⁄er to the other members of the coalition, which allows us to identify the maximal








of o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts. If all coalition members accept the o⁄er,
the government is formed, the proposed policy is implemented, and the o¢ ce-holding
bene￿ts are allocated as proposed. A new period t + 1 then begins with the status
quo qt = xt. If any party in the coalition rejects the o⁄er, the status quo qt￿1 is
the policy outcome in period t, and no redistribution of the o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts is
made.18 The status quo for period t + 1 then is qt = qt￿1.
We characterize a subgame perfect equilibrium. In the election stage we follow
Baron and Diermeier (2001) and seek a strong Nash equilibrium. That is, an allo-







is such that no group of voters has an incentive to
deviate from their equilibrium voting strategies. A few technical assumptions are
made for a formateur to break indi⁄erence, and these assumptions will be introduced
sequentially as the analysis proceeds.
18The government may be understood as being of cabinet form in which all government parties
must agree on the policy choice. An o⁄er to form a consensus government is thus conditional on all
coalition partners accepting the o⁄er.
113 Results
3.1 The Second Period
The equilibrium of the two-period multi-stage game is analyzed by backward induc-
tion. The game in the second period is a one-shot game, which was fully characterized
by Baron and Diermeier (2001). This subsection summarizes intuitions and results
relevant for our dynamic analysis.
3.1.1 Policy Choice in the Second Period
Redistribution of o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts allow parties in government to bargain e¢ -
ciently. Suppose that party k 2 fa;b;cg as formateur has decided to form a govern-
ment C2 in the second period when the status quo is q1. The formateur selects a
policy x￿









and then redistributes o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts so that each of its coalition partner(s)








The symmetric location of ideal points and the quadratic policy utility function jointly
imply the ￿rst lemma.
Lemma 1 In the second period: (A) A consensus government chooses the center of
party preferences z: (B) A majoritarian government formed by parties j and k chooses




:19 (C) A single-party
government formed by party k chooses its ideal point zk: (D) Any non-formateur
party j in government receives a redistribution y
j
2 = uj (q1)￿uj (x￿
2) of o¢ ce-holding
bene￿ts. The period-two utility of j is exactly its reservation value uj (q1): (E) The











The equilibrium policy choice depends only on which parties are in the govern-
ment, not on the proposer or the location of the status quo. The redistribution of
bene￿ts and the formateur￿ s utility, however, depend on the status quo. Note that
the status quo determines a party￿ s reservation value. Therefore, the formateur can
extract more bene￿ts the more the status quo disadvantages its possible coalition
partners. The status quo thus plays an important role in government formation.
3.1.2 Government Formation in the Second Period
In the government formation stage the formateur chooses a majority coalition to max-
imize its utility.20 Suppose that party a; for example, has been selected as formateur
in a parliament with all three parties represented.21
If party a decides to form a majoritarian government, it chooses the party that
is more disadvantaged by the status quo, since that party has a stronger incentive
19For example, government ab chooses policy zab = (0;0):
20For technical convenience, we assume that if a formateur is indi⁄erent between two majoritarian
governments, it ￿ ips a coin. Moreover, if it is indi⁄erent between a majoritarian government and a
consensus government, it chooses the latter. As will be evident in the analysis, the equilibrium policy
choice conditional on a consensus government leads to a greater aggregate utility of all parties as
well as all voters than the policy choice conditional on any majoritarian government. The selection
of a more e¢ cient equilibrium thus strengthens our main results on policy ine¢ ciency.
21Baron and Diermeier (2001) show that in any equilibrium all three parties are represented in
parliament, whether it is a minority or majority parliament.
13to induce the formateur to choose a policy more favorable to it. For expositional
purposes, suppose this is party c and the period-two status quo q1 is such that ub (q1) >
uc (q1):
Formateur party a prefers to form a consensus coalition rather than a majoritarian















where the left-hand-side is a￿ s utility if it forms a consensus government with policy
z; and the right-hand-side is its utility if it forms majoritarian government ac with
policy zac: This condition is equivalent to
u











Intuitively, if the reservation value of the non-formateur party with status-quo advan-
tage (i.e., party b in the example) is su¢ ciently low, the formateur chooses a consensus
coalition. This occurs if both the non-formateur parties strongly dislike the status
quo and hence are willing to make sizable concessions of o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts in
exchange for a centrist policy.
To facilitate the statement of results in Lemma 2, de￿ne Di ￿
￿




for any i 2 fa;b;cg, as the set of policy alternatives that yield party i a period utility
greater than ￿1
2. The preceding analysis implies that if the status quo q1 is outside
Di and ui (q1) ￿ uj (q1), party k as formateur prefers to form a consensus government
rather than a majoritarian government with party j:
Lemma 2 In the government formation stage of the second period with status quo






Figure 2: Illustration for Examples 1 and 2.
forms a majoritarian government with party i if q1 2 Di [ Dj and ui (q1) < uj (q1),
and (3) forms a majoritarian government with party i or j with probability 1
2 if
q1 2 Di [ Dj and ui (q1) = uj (q1).
3.1.3 Parliamentary Election in the Second Period
We next consider the strong Nash electoral equilibria in the second period. Since
voters know the status quo, q1, they can anticipate which coalitions and policies will
result for any distribution of seats in parliament. As shown by Baron and Diermeier
(2001), in equilibrium some voters may not vote for the parties whose ideal points are
closest to theirs. The intuition of strategic voting is explained through the following
two examples. These examples will be useful when we analyze the equilibrium policy
choice in the ￿rst period.











(the shaded area in the ￿gure), where
D
c
denotes the closure of Dc: By Lemma 2, given any parliament in which all three
15parties are represented, party c as formateur would form a consensus government
with the centrist policy z; whereas either party a or b as formateur would form
a majoritarian government ab with policy zab. Note that more than half of the
voters (for example, those whose ideal points are to the right of the perpendicular
hyperplane passing through z) strictly prefer z to zab: Therefore, if party c is not
elected as the majority party, there must exist a group of voters who want to switch
their votes from either a or b to c. If too many voters in the natural constituencies
of parties a and b vote strategically for c, however, both parties a and b would lose
representation in parliament. Then, as the majority party c would choose its ideal
point zc instead of z: The argument in this example can be generalized for any status





, for any distinct i;j;k 2 fa;b;cg; and leads to statement (B)
in Lemma 3 at the end of this subsection.
Note that in Example 1 there are multiple electoral equilibria. This is because vot-
ers do not care about the exact vote shares as long as all three parties are represented
and c is elected the majority party.
Example 2. Suppose that the period-two status quo is q1 = zab = (0;0): (Again,
see Figure 2.) Given that all three parties are represented in parliament, by Lemma
2, either party a or b as formateur would form a majoritarian government with party
c; which is more disadvantaged by the status quo and hence in a weaker bargaining
position. Once represented in parliament, party c would be included in any govern-
ment and the policy choice would be either zac or zbc: Foreseeing such a consequence,
some natural supporters of c who strictly prefer zac to zbc would strategically vote for
a instead of c: In this way, they increase the probability that party a is selected as for-
mateur and therefore the probability that zac becomes the policy outcome. Similarly,
some natural supporters of c who strictly prefer zbc to zac switch their votes from
16c to b. The extent of strategic voting by the supporters of c, however, is bounded
by the representation threshold m: In equilibrium voters give party c just enough
votes so that it is represented in the parliament and, by the symmetric distribution





each. The argument in






and leads to statement (D) in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 presents a complete characterization of the strong Nash electoral equi-
libria.
Lemma 3 Consider the parliamentary election in the second period with a status quo
q1: (A) If the status quo is such that any party as formateur would form a consensus
government with policy choice z; election of any parliament with all three parties
represented is a strong electoral equilibrium. (B) If the status quo is such that
only party i as formateur would form a consensus government with policy choice z;
every strong electoral equilibrium results in a majority parliament with three parties
represented, where party i is the majority party. (C) If the status quo is such that
party i as formateur would randomize between coalitions ij and ik and the other
two parties (j and k) as formateur would form governments with party i; any strong
electoral equilibrium results in a minority parliament with vote shares ￿i





2 (1 ￿ m). Majoritarian governments ij and ik and policy outcomes
zij and zik then result with probability one-half. (D) If the status quo is such that
party i as formateur would form a majoritarian government with each of the other
parties with probability 1
2; and the other two parties j and k would form majoritarian
governments with each other, a minority parliament results with a strong electoral















q1 = z, the unique strong equilibrium is equal vote shares for all three parties and an
17even lottery over zab, zac, and zbc.22
Lemma 3 implies a relationship between the bargaining advantage from the status
quo and the advantage in a parliamentary election. In particular, the party that in the
bargaining is relatively favored by the status quo obtains a (weakly) higher expected
seat share than the other parties and therefore a greater chance of being selected as
formateur. Similarly, the party that in the bargaining is relatively disadvantaged by
the status quo obtains a (weakly) lower expected seat share than the others. This
indicates that, when the period-one formateur strategically positions the policy to
gain a period-two bargaining advantage, it may also gain an advantage in period-two
election and hence increase its probability of heading the government again. This will
be made clear in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3 when we identify the electoral e⁄ect on policy
choice.
3.2 Policy Choice in the First Period
For any period-two status quo q1; let the continuation value vi(q1) of party i be its
expected utility calculated prior to the period-two election.23 For any period-one
22This lemma is a modi￿ed version of Proposition 4 in Baron and Diermeier (2001). Part (B) has
been restated and (E) added. Moreover, the equilibrium vote shares in part (D) are di⁄erent due
to a di⁄erent population structure. Baron and Diermeier (2001) assumed that voters￿ideal points
were uniformly distributed in the single-period Pareto set of the parties, whereas here voters￿ideal
points are assumed to be uniformly distributed in the disk Z ￿
￿
x 2 <2 : kzv ￿ zk < L
￿
:
23Lemma 3 implies that, in the second period for a large set of status quo alternatives, there exist
multiple electoral equilibria that may lead to the same policy outcome but di⁄erent distributions
of period-two utilities for the parties. To simply the analysis, we make two assumptions about
the selection of period-two electoral equilibria. First, if a period-two status quo is such that party
k as formateur would form a consensus government with the central policy z whereas any of the
other parties as formateur would be indi⁄erent between forming a majoritarian government and a
consensus government, the period-two electoral equilibrium is such that party k is elected as the
majority party. This assumption applies only to a period-two status quo on the boundary of Di for
some i 2 fa;b;cg and outside the set of Dj for all j 6= i: Second, for any other period-two status
quo, if there are multiple electoral equilibria, all equilibria identi￿ed in Lemma 3 occur with equal
probability. These selection rules assure that each period-two status quo is associated with unique
expected period-two utilities of the parties.
18status quo q0; let Ui (q0) = ui(q0) + ￿vi(q0) be the reservation value of party i in
the ￿rst period, so Ui (q0) is the sum of party i￿ s period-one utility with the status
quo policy q0 and no transfers, plus its discounted continuation value for the second
period with a status quo q1 = q0. The expected discounted sum of utilities of party
i in the ￿rst period is therefore yi
1 + Ui (x1) if a policy x1 is chosen and it receives a
redistribution yi
1 of o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts.
As in the second period, if party k as formatuer decides to form a government
coalition C1 in the ￿rst period, it must choose a policy x￿
1 that maximizes the joint









The formateur then redistributes o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts so that each of its coalition
partner(s) is just willing to vote for the government. If two distinct combinations
of policies and o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts attain the maximal two-period utility for the
formateur, it is assumed to choose the one with which it is more likely to be selected as
formateur in the second period. This assumption helps eliminate additional equilibria
in the ￿rst period. Substantively, it amounts to a party￿ s lexicographic preference to
head a government.
In what follows, we characterize the equilibrium policy choice conditional on the
type of government and the formateur selected.
3.2.1 Policy Choice - Majoritarian Government
Consider a majoritarian government ab formed by party a in the ￿rst period. If the
parties are solely concerned about their period-one utilities, i.e., ￿ = 0; the period-one












Figure 3: Policy choices by majoritarian government ab formed by party a in the ￿rst
period.
b: Although strategically irrelevant when ￿ = 0 this policy advantages parties a and
b in the period-two election yielding a vote share of 1￿m
2 , as explained in Example 2.
For ￿ positive but su¢ ciently small, the formateur chooses a policy, as illustrated
by b xS in Figure 3, that is equidistant from za and zb but farther away from zc: This
policy sacri￿ces period-one utility of parties a and b but increases their joint period-
two utility, since policy b xS as status quo in the second period further disadvantages
the out party c in the period-two bargaining over government formation and policy
choice, allowing any of the government members as period-two formateur to obtain
more o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts from c: Also, parties a and b expect a vote share of 1￿m
2
in the period-two election. Since each is more likely than c to be the period-two
formateur, a and b have a stronger incentive for strategic policy manipulation to
disadvantage c than what they would do if the seat shares were ￿xed and equally
distributed in the second period. As ￿ increases, the parties care more about the
20their future utilities, so a majoritarian government chooses a more extreme policy.
If the discount factor of the parties is su¢ ciently high, the future is su¢ ciently
important that the formateur sacri￿ces e¢ ciency in the ￿rst period to position strate-
gically the status quo to gain electoral advantage and induce the e¢ cient policy in the
second period. Speci￿cally, the formateur forms a government with b at a policy in
D
a
n(Db [ Dc); illustrated as the shaded area in Figure 3. Such a policy, for example
b xM, substantially lowers the joint period-one utility of the government parties, but
it is su¢ ciently far from zb and zc that a receives a majority vote share in the next
election because voters understand that if either b or c were to be the formateur they
would choose police zbc that is less central than the policy z that party a would choose
with a majority. As ￿ increases the policy moves along the boundary of Db until at
￿ = e ￿ =
p
3 ￿ 1 it reaches b xL ￿ (￿1
2;0), which is the intersection of the boundaries
of Da and Db: As ￿ increases further, the policy moves along the boundary of Da,








The policy is outside the single-period Pareto set of party preferences for all ￿ > 0;
and it is farther away from the center of preferences as ￿ increases. The institutions
of the parliamentary system thus give rise to a centrifugal force that results in Pareto
ine¢ cient policies. The next proposition formalizes the period-one equilibrium policy
and its consequences. The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 Consider a majoritarian government ab formed by party a in the ￿rst
period. (A) If the discount factor of the parties satis￿es ￿ < ￿
￿ (m), where ￿
￿ (m) is











which is equidistant from the ideal points of parties a and b and farther from the ideal
21point of the out party c:24 In the second period both parties a and b obtain a vote
share 1￿m
2 , and party c obtains a vote share m: Any period-two formateur forms a
majoritarian government that includes party c and the policy outcome x￿
2 is either zac
or zcb with probability one-half each. (B) If the discount factor of the parties satis￿es
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (m); the period-one policy outcome is farther from the ideal point of the out

































In the second period there is a majority parliament with all parties represented, where
the period-one formateur a receives a majority of the vote and forms a consensus
government with policy z. (C) Regardless of the discount factor the period-one policy
outcome is outside the single-period Pareto set of the three parties.
3.2.2 Policy Choice - Consensus Government
Next, consider a consensus government formed by party c in the ￿rst period. The
formateur faces an intertemporal tradeo⁄. If the discount factor of the parties is
su¢ ciently low, it prefers the policy z that is e¢ cient in the current period. As a
consequence in the second period each party receives one-third of the vote, and a
majoritarian government is formed with policy at the midpoint of the contract curve
of the government parties.
Similar to the case of majoritarian government, for ￿ su¢ ciently large, party c as
24The value of ￿
￿ (m) ranges from approximately 0.17 to 0.26. The function ￿
￿(m) is characterized
in Appendix A.
22formateur chooses xc = (1
2;0), illustrated in Figure 2, which as the status quo induces
strategic voting in favor of party c causing it to receive a majority of the vote. With a
majority, party c forms a consensus government in the second period with the e¢ cient
policy z. In contrast, if either party a or b was the period-two formateur, they would
form a majoritarian government with each other and choose a more extreme policy.
Voters thus give c a majority. The policy xc disadvantages parties a and b in the next
election and also disadvantages them in the bargaining over government formation
and policy choice in the second period. Party c thus must provide the other parties
with su¢ cient bene￿ts in the ￿rst period to obtain xc rather than z.
Consensus governments always choose a ￿rst-period policy that is interior to the
single-period Pareto set of the parties, but the institutions of the parliamentary system
create incentives that give rise to a centrifugal force that moves policy away from z.
Proposition 1 formalizes this intuition, and the proof is presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 Consider a consensus government formed by party c in the ￿rst pe-
riod. (A) If the discount factor of the parties is su¢ ciently small, ￿ < ^ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ 2
p
3;
the period-one policy outcome is the center of preferences z: As a consequence, in the
second period there is a minority parliament with majoritarian governments, each
of which is formed with probability one-third. The policy for any government jk is
the midpoint zjk of the contract curve. (B) If the discount factor of the parties is






In the second period party c receives a majority vote share and as formateur forms a
consensus government with policy z.
233.2.3 Policy Choice - Single-Party Government
Finally, consider a single-party government formed by a majority party c in the ￿rst





; and remains the
majority party in the second period because it would in the second period choose the
centrist policy ￿ z whereas parties a and b would choose a more extreme policy. As
￿ increases, it chooses a policy equidistant but farther from the ideal points of the
other two parties, and hence outside the Pareto set. Such a policy sacri￿ces party c￿ s
period-one utility but allows it to obtain more o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts in the second
period once it is selected as the period-two formateur. At the same time, the policy
remains in D
c
, so c remains a majority party in the second period.
The period-one policy cannot be too extreme, however, since then any party as
period-two formateur would form a consensus government with z; and c would lose
its electoral advantage. The formateur prefers to retain that electoral advantage that
yields it a majority and hence restrains its period-one policy choice within D
c
. Again,
electoral considerations bound the extent of the ine¢ ciency.
The next proposition formalizes the preceding analysis. The proof is presented in
Appendix A.
Proposition 3 In the ￿rst period any single-party government, for example, formed
by majority party c; chooses a policy that favors itself but is far and equally distant
from the ideal points of the other parties and outside the Pareto set for ￿ > 0. In



























2 + 1 p
2;0
￿
; if ￿ ￿ ￿
o:
In the second period party c remains the majority party and forms a consensus gov-
24ernment with policy z.
3.2.4 Dynamics of Governments and Policies
Propositions 1-3 identify a rich set of dynamics of government coalitions and their
policy choices. Consider ￿rst the case in which a majoritarian government is formed
in the ￿rst period. As a function of political patience, begin with a low ￿, and
assume that a is the formateur and b is its government partner. As ￿ increases the
policy moves away from the mid-point of the government contract curve but remains
equidistant from the ideal points of the government parties, as illustrated by the
point ^ xS in Figure 3. In the second period a minority parliament and a majoritarian
government result with the policy at the mid-point of the government parties￿contract
curve.
As ￿ increases above ￿
￿(m), the period-one policy jumps to the boundary of Db
and toward the ideal point of a, as illustrated by ^ xM in Figure 3. This disadvantages
party b as well as party c. As ￿ increases further, the ￿rst-period policy moves along
the boundary until it reaches ^ xL in Figure 3. Further increases in ￿ cause the period-
one formateur to choose a policy farther from the ideal points of both the other
parties, as illustrated by ^ xX. For all ￿ > ￿
￿(m), if selected as formateur in period
two, the period-one formateur a would choose ￿ z, whereas the other parties would
choose a more extreme policy. Hence, party a receives a majority of the vote in the
election, and forms a consensus government in period two with policy ￿ z.
Now consider a consensus government formed by party c in the ￿rst period. For
￿ < ^ ￿ the period-one formateur c chooses a policy ￿ z, and neither the government nor
the policy is sustainable in the second period. A minority parliament results in the
second period, and majoritarian governments are formed with policies at the mid-
point of the government parties￿contract curve. As ￿ increases above ^ ￿, the policy
25jumps towards the formateur￿ s ideal point to the policy xc = (1
2;0) shown in Figure
2. This policy disadvantages both of the other parties and results in a majority vote
for party c. In period two party c forms a consensus government with policy ￿ z. The
type of government thus persists but not its policy.
Government transition and policy change thus should be expected in parliamen-
tary systems. Moreover, whenever majoritarian governments are formed and there
are future elections, the policies chosen by the governments formed are ine¢ cient.
3.3 Electoral versus Bargaining E⁄ects
To understand the incentives of parties to position strategically the status quo for
the second period, it is useful to identify two di⁄erent e⁄ects that drive our results.
The bargaining e⁄ect isolates how the incentive to gain bargaining advantage in the
future leads to a more extreme policy in the ￿rst period, assuming exogenous and
equal seat shares of the parties in the next period. The electoral e⁄ect captures how
the presence of a parliamentary election with strategic voters leads to a more extreme
policy in the ￿rst period.
To identify these two e⁄ects we compare our result to the case where each party
exogenously receives one-third of the votes in each election. This case has been
analyzed in Fong (2006), where it is interpreted as a model with sincere voting. Fong
(2006) shows that for a consensus government there is no strategic positioning of the
status quo, no matter how much parties care about the future. The parties choose
the center z of preferences, which leads to a majoritarian government in period two
with policy at the mid-point of the government parties￿contract curve. In contrast,
a majoritarian government, formed by parties a and b, for example, chooses a policy
that is equidistant from the ideal points of the government parties, far from the ideal
26point of the out party c, and outside the single-period Pareto set. In particular, there


























Strategically positioning the status quo reduces the joint period-one utility of parties
a and b, but in this case each government member, if it is the formateur in period
two, will form a government with party c and receive greater o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts
from c:25 The formateur thus has an intertemporal tradeo⁄. As the parties care
more about the future, the period-one formateur chooses a more extreme policy.
As the discount factor increases above the cuto⁄ ￿; the period-one policy jumps to a





, that as the status quo would result in a consensus
government in the second period. This allows party a, if recognized as the period-two
formateur, to maximize the joint period-two utility of all three parties and receive
o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts from both of the other ones.
The electoral e⁄ect can be identi￿ed by subtracting the bargaining e⁄ect charac-
terized above from the total e⁄ect of institutions on policy choice. To quantify the
bargaining and electoral e⁄ects, we de￿ne a metric to measure the extremeness of the
policy choice and use this metric to compare equilibrium policies in models with and
without elections. For any policy x 2 <2; let DTC (x) ￿ kx ￿ zk be the distance from
the policy x to the center of preferences z: The bargaining e⁄ect then is measured by
DTC (e x1)￿DTC (x￿
2); where e x1 denotes the equilibrium period-one policy choice in
the model with no election and x￿
2 denotes the equilibrium policy choice in a single-
25If party c is selected as formateur, it forms a majoritarian government with either party a or
b and is able to extract more o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts from its government partner than if the status
quo were zab = (0;0). Due to strict concavity of the utility functions, however, this is a second-order
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Figure 4: The bargaining e⁄ect and the electoral e⁄ect conditional on the types of
government. Calculation is based on m = 10%:
period model (or in the second period of our model). The electoral e⁄ect is measured
by DTC (x￿
1)￿DTC (e x1); where x￿
1 denotes the equilibrium period-one policy choice
in our model with strategic voters. These e⁄ects are identi￿ed in Figure 4 for the
types of government in the ￿rst period with the representation hurdle m = 10%:
As indicated in Propositions 2 to 3, the incentives created by the institutions of a
parliamentary democracy exert centrifugal forces on the policy in the ￿rst period, and
those forces are generally stronger, and the period-one policy more extreme, the higher
is the discount factor ￿ of the parties.26 One centrifugal force is due to the incentives
created by the institutions of government formation and legislation. This centrifugal
force plays a role only under a majoritarian government, and the bargaining e⁄ect
is weakly increasing in ￿. The second centrifugal force is due to the institution of
elections. For example, consider a period-one majoritarian government with a low
26Scho￿eld and Sened (2006, p.63) also identify a centrifugal force.
28￿. As implied by Lemma 3, the party disadvantaged by the period-one bargaining
e⁄ect is also disadvantaged in the election because both parties in the incumbent
government would form a majoritarian government with the out party from the ￿rst
period. This attracts some voters located close to the out party and induces the
incumbent to choose an even more extreme policy in the ￿rst period. The electoral
e⁄ect thus is in general positive, leading to a more extreme policy outcome, except
for the the values of ￿ around ￿; where there is a jump in the bargaining e⁄ect. The
electoral e⁄ect also plays a role under a consensus government, since for ￿ su¢ ciently
large, the formateur of a consensus government chooses a non-central policy biased
toward its ideal point to ensure that it receives a majority in the election. Elections
under proportional representation thus impose a centrifugal incentive on the political
parties that leads to more extreme policies.
3.4 Government Formation and Parliamentary Election in
the First Period
The characterizations and comparative statics in the previous subsections were condi-
tional on the type of government formed in the ￿rst period. This suggests that voters
may be able to avoid extreme policies in the ￿rst period through the period-one elec-
tion. Which type of government forms in the ￿rst period depends on the initial status
quo q0; the election outcome, and the identity of the formateur. Although the analysis
is similar to that for the second period, the mapping from the initial status quo to
the period-one election outcome, selection of formateur, and choice of government is
both quite complex and discontinuous. So, we focus here on whether voters can avoid
extreme policy outcomes through their votes in the parliamentary election. We make
the following observations.
29First, in the ￿rst period a single-party government is never formed. Suppose
otherwise that the initial status quo is such that some party i, if elected as the
majority party, would form a single-party government. In this case, the electorate
would never give a majority of votes to party i. By Proposition 3, any single-party
government would choose an extreme policy for its own electoral advantage in the
second period. This policy choice is so extreme such that, even if the voters are very
patient, a majority of voters would be better o⁄with a minority parliament and with,
for example, a randomization of policies chosen by some majoritarian governments.
Thus, single-party governments will not be considered further.
Second, in the ￿rst period all three parties are represented in parliament. If
only two parties, for example a and b, were represented, the policy outcome would be
strongly biased against party c. The constituents of party c then would be better o⁄if
party c were represented so that it had a chance to be either selected as the formateur
or included in the period-one government. Therefore, they will ensure that party c
is represented. There are always enough c supporters to meet the representation
threshold.
Third, recall that a formateur chooses to form a consensus government with a
central policy only if the reservation values of both the other parties are su¢ ciently
low, since then it will receive sizable transfers of o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts from the
other parties in exchange for policy concessions. This requires that the status quo
be extreme. Consequently, only i the initial status quo q0 is su¢ ciently extreme,
some party i as formateur would form a consensus government with a central policy
is not possible if q0 is su¢ ciently central. This insight is summarized in the next
proposition. The proof is presented in Appendix B.
Proposition 4 If the initial status quo is su¢ ciently close to the center of voter
30preferences, the electorate can do nothing in the period-one election to limit the
extent of the policy extremeness in the ￿rst period by any formed government.
In other words, whereas the period-two election exerts a centrifugal force on policy
choice in the ￿rst period, with a relatively central initial status quo the period-one
election cannot counterbalance this force.
4 Discussion
4.1 Welfare Implications and Political Failure
Proposition 1 identi￿es a political failure when the parties care about the future,
where ￿political failure" is de￿ned as a policy that is outside the single-period Pareto
set of party preferences.27 The political failure is due to both the institution of
elections and the institution of government formation and legislation. These failures
appear unavoidable, as long as voting is an inalienable right and voters and parties
are unable to commit to future actions.
One source of the political failure associated with elections is voters, who are will-
ing to reward centrist policies in the ￿nal period even though it induces ine¢ ciency in
the previous period. This results because voters cannot commit to how they will vote
in future elections. If all voters were loyal to a party, and hence voted sincerely, this
source of political failure would be eliminated. A second source of the political fail-
ure associated with elections lies with parties, which may have di¢ culty committing
to enact, or not to enact, particular policies. A party￿ s platform or a pre-announced
electoral coalition could be credible, but only if voters were to punish a party for devi-
ating. Parties may be able to develop reputations for ful￿lling promises, but political
27This is consistent with Besley and Coate (1998), who de￿ne a political failure as the failure to
make a Pareto-improving investment.
31temptations to exploit a reputation for short-term gains can be strong, particularly
when voters are sophisticated and respond to the anticipated future actions by the
parties. Moreover, the centrifugal force is stronger when the future is more important
to the parties, which may make reputations more di¢ cult to sustain.
A political failure also results from the incentives created by the institution of
government formation and legislation. In the absence of elections the opportunity
to disadvantage a party in future bargaining over governments and policy can lead
a majoritarian government to position the status quo outside the Pareto set. This
political failure resulting from the bargaining e⁄ect is generally increasing in political
patience.
In addition to identifying political failures, the model can be used to evaluate
the welfare of voters and how their welfare responds to the impatience of political
parties. Social welfare is de￿ned as the average two-period utility of all voters. The
average single-period utility can be shown to be approximately a constant plus that of
a hypothetical voter with ideal point z.28 Given a policy x, the average single-period
utility of all voters is then measured by ￿kx ￿ zk
2. Similarly, the average two-period
utility of all voters is measured by ￿kx1 ￿ zk
2 ￿ ￿ kx2 ￿ zk
2 ; where ￿ 2 [0;1] is the
discount factor of voters.
As shown above, for most of the domain of ￿ and conditional on any form of
the government, the period-one policy is more extreme if the voters vote strategi-
cally in the second period than if they vote sincerely. This implies that, conditional
on any type of period-one government, on average voters are worse o⁄ if they vote
strategically than sincerely. That is, voters cannot commit not to anticipate which
governments might form or the policies they would choose. The parties anticipate
this and choose a policy that is more extreme.
28The proof is available from the authors upon request.
32By Proposition 1 conditional on a majoritarian government being formed in the
￿rst period, the voters on average are worse o⁄ for higher ￿ 2 [0;￿
￿ (m)) or ￿ 2
(￿
￿ (m);1]. This implies that social welfare is lower as the parties care more about
the future. This results because the period-one formateur has an incentive to choose
a more extreme policy as the future becomes more important. A more extreme policy
achieves two purposes for the formateur. First, it reduces the vote shares the other
parties are likely to receive in the subsequent election. This increases the probability
that the period-one formateur will again be the formateur in the second period.
Second, if the period-one formateur is recognized as the period-two formateur, it
obtains greater o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts from its future coalition partners, since they
are more disadvantaged in the bargaining.29
4.2 Strategic Voting
One implication of the model is the e⁄ect of strategic voting. As voters rationally
calculate the consequences of their votes and cast their votes accordingly, they become
manipulable by political parties through policy choices and they are generally worse
o⁄.
Whether voters vote sincerely or strategically in parliamentary elections is an em-
pirical question, but our model sheds light on how such studies could be conducted.30
The analysis in Section 3.2 with strategic voting implies that on the equilibrium path
any party included in an incumbent government receives on average a (weakly) greater
29Note that when ￿ moves from slightly below to slightly above ￿
￿ (m), on average the voters are
better o⁄. This is because for ￿ 2 (￿
￿ (m);1] the period-one policy is so extreme that in the second
period a consensus government with a central policy z will result with probability one. This leads
to a discrete jump of period-two utility for the average voter. The same result obtains if in the ￿rst
period a consensus government is formed; i.e., replace ￿
￿ (m) in the above statement by b ￿.
30The few existing empirical studies (Cox 1997, Bawn 1999) have focused on the e⁄ects of vari-
ations in voting rules on voting behavior. Examples include representation thresholds or mutiple-
ballot systems. To our knowledge there is no empirical work that has directly studied strategic
voting in the context with government formation.
33vote share than the out party in the subsequent election and therefore a higher proba-
bility of being recognized as the next formateur.31 Moreover, an incumbent formateur
receives a (weakly) larger vote share than any other party in the subsequent election
and therefore it is (weakly) the most likely party to head the government in the next
period.
The explanation for these results proceeds in three steps. First, the parties dis-
advantaged by the status quo have less bargaining power in the parliament and thus
are more likely to be included in the new government after the election. Second,
foreseeing this, some natural constituents of the disadvantaged parties strategically
vote for their second preferred party, which is the party favored by the status quo.
Third, an incumbent government has an incentive to propose a policy to advantage
itself and disadvantage the out parties to gain not only more bargaining power but
also more votes from strategic voters. The incumbent thus attains an electoral ad-
vantage with strategic voters that is not present if voters vote sincerely for parties
whose ideal points are closest to theirs. Evidence of an incumbency advantage in
proportional representation systems is therefore consistent with the implications of
strategic voting.
4.3 The Role of the Representation Threshold
Proposition 1 implies that, ceteris paribus, when the discount factor of the parties
is su¢ ciently small, a higher representation threshold leads to a less extreme policy
choice by a majoritarian government. Consider the natural constituents of a party
31There, however, exist equilibria in which the out party receives a greater vote share than the







￿ (m);1], and suppose that in the ￿rst period party a as formateur forms a majoritarian
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constitute a period-two strong electoral equilibrium in which
party c receives more votes than b:
34i that is relatively disadvantaged by the period-two status quo. To have their party
represented in parliament, at least an m proportion of voters have to vote for party i.
A higher threshold thus restricts the extent to which those natural constituents can
vote strategically. This lowers the probability that any of the parties in the period-one
majoritarian government will be recognized as formateur and mitigates the incentive
of a period-one majoritarian government to choose a more extreme policy.
The representation threshold, however, does not a⁄ect the policy outcome if the
discount factor of the parties is su¢ ciently large. In that case, the period-one forma-
teur chooses a policy to ensure that it is elected as the majority party in the second
period, and period-two outcomes are independent of the representation threshold.
The testable implication then is that among countries with low political patience
the policies are less extreme the higher the representation threshold, whereas among
countries with higher political patience policy is independent of the threshold.
Social welfare is strictly increasing in the representation threshold if the discount
factor is su¢ ciently small, since a higher threshold bene￿ts an average voter by serving
as a commitment device that reduces strategic voting. Although unmodeled here, a
di⁄erent type of incentive for strategic voting may be created by the representation
thresholds (Cox 1997). Supporters of parties with an expected vote share too small to
cross the threshold may rationally abandon their most preferred party and vote for a
party that is assured representation to avoid wasting their vote. Therefore, a potential
cost of a higher representation threshold is that parties that represent minority groups
may be unable to obtain su¢ cient votes for representation in parliament.
354.4 An Alternative Interpretation of the Discount Factor
In the model, a government cannot fail before the next regularly scheduled election,
so the life span of a government corresponds to the length of an interelection period.
Yet, a de￿ning feature of most parliamentary systems is that an incumbent govern-
ment can be removed by parliament at any time during the interelection period, e.g.,
by a successful no-con￿dence motion. In many countries this can also lead to the
dissolution of parliament and early elections. In western European multiparty par-
liamentary systems in the postwar period, the average duration of governments has
varied from 13 months in Italy to 45 months in Luxembourg (Laver and Scho￿eld
1990). If politicians all subjectively discount their future utility at similar annual
rates, politicians in countries with shorter expected life spans of governments should
have a higher per period discount factor, i.e., a larger ￿, than politicians in countries
with longer life spans.32 In the model this corresponds to Italians having higher ￿￿ s
than Luxembourgers.
Such di⁄erences could also result from some unmodeled constitutional feature,
such as the requirements for con￿dence and censure procedures, that may a⁄ect the
stability and therefore duration of governments. For example, it may be more di¢ cult
to replace a government in a country with a constructive vote of con￿dence than in a
country in which a successful no-con￿dence motion can end a government.33 If these
factors a⁄ect the average duration of government, a higher (lower) discount factor can
be interpreted not only as more (less) patience of the parties, but also as a political
system that leads to more (less) frequent government turnover. While the former
32Suppose that a political party has an annual discount factor ￿0 2 [0;1]. If it expects a govern-
ment to last for T years, its per period discount factor is ￿ = ￿
T
0 ; which is decreasing in T.
33There is a large empirical literature on the factors that in￿ uence cabinet duration including
constitutional features. See Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2003) for a recent example.
36may be di¢ cult to measure, the latter can be easily measured.34
5 Concluding Remarks
The principal institutions of parliamentary democracies are elections, government
formation, and legislatures. Since the government serves with the con￿dence of the
parliament, government formation and legislation are necessarily intertwined and a
bargaining perspective is a natural approach to studying coalition formation and pol-
icy choice. Both government formation and legislation depend on representation in
parliament, and the modal electoral institution is proportional representation. Polit-
ical incentives arise from all three institutions, and both political parties and voters
respond to those incentives.
This paper identi￿es how the incentives present in a multiparty parliamentary
system a⁄ect the dynamics of representation, government, and policy. The bargain-
ing over government formation and policy choice creates intertemporal incentives,
since the current policy choice a⁄ects the bargaining positions of parties in the next
period. When parties are politically patient, bargaining incentives can lead a ma-
joritarian government to choose a policy outside the single-period Pareto set of the
parties, and the ine¢ ciency is increasing in political patience. Elections determine
the representation of parties and also the likelihood that a party will be selected as
formateur. This provides incentives for parties to position the current policy to gain
an advantage in the next election. The incentives arise because voters anticipate
both the governments that could form in the next period and the policies they would
choose as a function of representation and the status quo. These electoral incentives
can lead to policies farther from the center of voter preferences. Political failures thus
34To estimate political patience, another possibility may be to measure the expected tenure of
party leaders.
37result from both government formation and elections, and those failures provide cen-
trifugal forces on policy choice. These forces are generally stronger the more patient
are political parties.
The incentives present in a parliamentary system a⁄ect the continuity of govern-
ments and policy. These incentives are su¢ ciently strong that governments generally
do not persist from one interelection period to the next and neither do their policies.
Government transition and policy change thus should be expected in parliamentary
systems, independently of whether there are shocks to the system. How transition
and policy changes depend on the time horizon is left to future research.
The incentives leading to policy ine¢ ciency and transitions in government and
policy are due in part to commitment problems. If voters could commit to loyalty to
a party, the centrifugal force arising from elections would not be present. If parties
could commit credibly to the governments they would form and the policies they
would choose, the centrifugal force arising from bargaining over government formation
and policy would be mitigated, although not eliminated. We assumed that parties
cannot commit to future governments or policies, but we implicitly assumed that
parties can commit not to dissolve a government before the next scheduled election.
We leave endogenous government termination, either voluntarily or through a no-
con￿dence motion, for future work.
Our theory predicts that majority parties can arise. This prediction is contrary to
empirical evidence: Majority parties are rare in proportional representation systems.
In the context of the model the absence of majority parties is implied by three fac-
tors: politically impatient parties, a centrally located status quo, or voters who vote
sincerely or are loyal to a party. Extensions of the current model could make it less
likely that a majority party would emerge in equilibrium. First, the electorate could
be a mixture of voters with di⁄erent voting behaviors. If the fraction of sincere voters
38is su¢ ciently large, a majority party may not be formed even with strategic voting
by those sophisticated voters. Second, the current model considers a parliamentary
system with only three exogenously-given parties and without entry. With more par-
ties or endogenous entry, a majority would be more di¢ cult to obtain. We also leave
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Figure 5: Transformation of coordinates: the F-representation.
Appendix
Throughout the Appendix, we apply a notation system that locates the positions of
di⁄erent policy alternatives. For any x 2 <2 and for any distinct i;j = a;b;c; there
exist hij;wij 2 < such that
























(See Figure 5 for an illustration.) With the coordinate system of Fij (￿), any policy
is described according to its position relative to the ideal points of all three parties.




Moreover, let Hi (C) denote the optimal policy choice by party i as formateur
when it forms a government coalition C in the ￿rst period. Since parties care about
their status as formateur (or heads of government) in addition to the policy, a forma-
teur may propose a policy that yields a greater chance of getting more votes in the
subsequent parliamentary election.
40A Proofs of Propositions 1-3
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider a consensus government formed by party a
in period one. Note that a formateur will propose a policy that maximizes the joint
two-period utility of all members in the government, since it can use redistributions of
o¢ ce-holding bene￿ts as instruments to reallocate the utilities of the parties. There-
fore, the proof involves the Ha (abc) that maximizes the joint two-period utility of
all three parties and yields party a the highest probability of being recognized as
period-two formateur among all policy alteratives that maximize this joint utility.








2 ￿ <2 nRC
1 . Note that neither RC
1 nor RC
2 is convex. In the
second period, a status quo in RC
1 or RC
2 leads to a di⁄erent joint utility for all three
parties. The approach is to characterize local maxima in these regions separately and
then compare them to identify the globally optimal policy choice for party a. An
optimal policy in a region R is denoted by Ha (abcjR).
Region RC
1 Suppose that a consensus government is restricted to choose a
policy from region RC
1 . Then by Lemmata 1 to 3 in the second period a majoritarian




































2 Suppose that a consensus government is restricted to choose a
policy in region RC
2 . Then by Lemmata 1 to 3 in the second period all three parties
will be represented in parliament and a consensus government will be formed with

























2 ￿ 2 ￿ ￿,
















that only if the last policy alternative is chosen, in the second period party a will
receive a majority vote share and be recognized as formateur for certain. Therefore,





































where b ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ 2
p
3.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider majoritarian government ab formed by party a in period one. The goal
is to identify the Ha (ab) that maximizes the joint two-period utility of parties a and b
and yields party a the highest probability of being recognized as period-two formateur
among all policy alteratives that maximize this joint utility.
Let Qij ￿ fx 2 <2 : ui (x) > uj (x) > uk (x)g for all i;j;k = a;b;c, i 6= j 6= k, and
partition the policy space into 10 regions. In the second period, a status quo in a






























4 ￿ Da \ Db \ (Qab [ Qba);
RT




fui (x)g > min
i=a;b










































The approach is again to characterize local maxima or suprema in these regions
separately and then compare them to identify the globally optimal policy choice for
party a. An optimal policy in a region R is denoted by Ha (abjR):
Region RT
1 Suppose that government ab is restricted to choose a policy from
region RT






the ￿rst period. Then by Lemma 3 and the equilibrium selection rules assumed,
in the second period all three parties will be represented, and party a will receive
a majority vote share.35 By Lemmata 1 and 2 party a as formateur will form a
consensus government with policy z, and the joint period-two utility of parties a and









0) + ￿ (￿1 ￿ uc (x
0)); (1)
35The equilibrium selection rules apply only if q1 = x0 is on the border of D
a























s:t: kx0 ￿ zak
2 ￿ 1
2;




where the objective function on the right-hand side is a simpli￿cation of equation
(1), and the three constraint inequalities correspond to the constraints that x0 2 D
a
,


































































This is a corner solution, since either the constraint
￿ ￿x0 ￿ zb￿ ￿2 ￿ 1
2 or that kx0 ￿ zak
2 ￿
1





















attains the same maximum in RT
1 . However, if this policy is chosen in the ￿rst pe-
riod, by Lemma 3 and the equilibrium selection rules assumed, party a will never
be recognized as period-two formateur since party b will be elected as the major-




















2 Suppose that a policy x0 2 RT
2 is chosen in the ￿rst period. Then
44by Lemma 3, in the second period party c will receive a vote share of m, and both
parties a and b will receive 1￿m
2 . As a consequence, with probability m party c will
be recognized as formateur and randomize between majoritarian governments ac and
bc. If, for example, a majoritarian government ac is formed, the joint period-two





; party a gets its reservation value





since it is excluded
from the new government coalition. With probability 1 ￿ m, either party a or b will
be recognized, and the formateur will form a majoritarian coalition with party c.
The joint period-two utility of parties a and b then will be
￿
￿1

















































































































, the local supremumis attained by an interior policy Fab (h￿;0) 2
45RT
2 where h￿ ￿
(1￿m)￿
2￿(1￿2m)￿, and therefore a supremum is a maximum. On the other




, a maximum does not exist in region RT
2 . To see this,
pick any policy Fab (h;0) 2 RT
2 and de￿ne h(") ￿ "h￿ + (1 ￿ ")h. Since RT
2 is an
open region, Fab (h(");0) 2 RT
2 for " > 0 su¢ ciently small. Note that ￿(h) is
strictly concave and h￿ = argmaxh02< ￿(h0). Therefore,
P
i=a;b Ui (Fab (h(");0)) >
P
i=a;b Ui (Fab (h;0)). Finally, supx02RT
2
P
i=a;b Ui (x0) ￿ maxx02RT
1
P
i=a;b Ui (x0) for
all ￿ 2 [￿












for all m. This can be veri￿ed by comparing the functional
forms of local maxima and/or suprema in regions RT
1 and RT
2 . The function ￿
￿ (m)
will be characterized in the last part of the proof.
Region RT
3 Suppose that a policy x0 2 RT
3 is chosen in the ￿rst period.
Then by Lemmata 1 to 3, in the second period all three parties will be represented,
each party will be recognized as formateur with probability one-third (which is the
probability they perceive before the period-two election), and a consensus government
will be formed. Therefore, with probability one-third, party c will be recognized
and the joint period-two utility of parties a and b will be ua (x0) + ub (x0) because
both of them will be included in the consensus coalition and receive their period-two
reservation values. With probability two-thirds, either party a or b will be recognized,
and their joint period-two utility will be (￿1) ￿ uc (x0), which is the joint utility of




































6 (1 + ￿)(3 ￿ ￿)


























10 The procedures to characterize local maxima (or suprema)
in regions RT
4 to RT
10 are similar to those for regions RT
1 ; RT
2 and RT
3 : To save space,











































Ui (z) = ￿
4+5￿
6 ; (RT






Ui (x0) = ￿(1 + ￿):









Comparison This analysis has shown that Ha (ab) = 2 RT
r for r = 3;4;:::;10.


















The analysis of local maxima in regions RT
1 and RT





























; if ￿ 2 [￿
￿ (m);1]:
Characterization of ￿
￿ (m) Consider the claim that supx02RT
2
P




i=a;b Ui (x0) for all ￿ 2 [￿






￿ (m) is a





for all m. To show this, ￿rst of all,











































2 ￿ 1 > 0.
48Therefore, ￿































2 ￿ (7 ￿ 12m ￿ m2)￿
2 ￿ 2(7 ￿ 4m)￿ + 12;
which is equivalent to
￿(￿;m) ￿ ￿
￿














19 ￿ 32m ￿ 22m
2￿
￿
2 + 16(5 + 4m)￿ ￿ 16
￿ 0:





; (1) ￿(0;m) < 0, (2) lim
￿!1
￿(￿;m) < 0, (3) ￿(1;m) =
7+168m+122m2￿8m3￿m4 > 0, and (4) ￿(￿;m) = 0 is a biquadratic equation in ￿
with four roots. There are standard procedures of solving a biquadratic equation, and
it can be veri￿ed that (5) two of its roots are real and the other two are imaginary.
Call the two real roots ￿
￿
1 (m) and ￿
￿
2 (m) such that ￿
￿
1 (m) ￿ ￿
￿
2 (m). By (1), (2),
(3) and (5), it follows that 0 < ￿
￿
1 (m) < 1 < ￿
￿
2 (m), and for all ￿ 2 [￿
￿
1 (m);1];













￿ (m) = ￿
￿
1 (m) and ￿
￿ (m) > 0: Finally, it can be veri￿ed that the
relationship between ￿
￿ (m) and m is as shown in Figure 6.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a single-party government formed by party c in
the ￿rst period. Party c chooses a policy to maximize its expected discounted sum of










Suppose that party c is restricted to choose a policy x0 from the set of RS
1. Then
in the second period the parliamentary election leads to a majority parliament, and
49the majority party c forms a consensus government with policy z: This implies that














4 (2￿ ￿ 1)h
2 ￿ 3














For ￿ ￿ 1
2, the policy is as extreme as possible while still leading to a consensus
government in the second period formed by c. That is, h￿ = b h ￿ ￿1￿
q
2
3: For ￿ < 1
2,
the maximum is attained at an interior solution h￿ = ￿ 1










and at a corner solution h￿ = b h otherwise.
Suppose that party c is restricted to choose a policy x0 from the set of RS
2: Then
compared to the case with a policy choice in RS
1; the probability that party a is
recognized as period-two formateur substantially dropped from one to below one-
half. Therefore, party a loses some of its expected utility in the second period. At
the same time, by choosing a policy outside RS
1; party a makes the policy farther
away from its ideal point and thus lowers its period-one utility. Thus, in equilibrium
party a does not choose a policy in region RS
2:
B Proof of Proposition 4
We ￿rst show that this proposition is true for q0 = z: Suppose that all three parties
are represented in parliament and party a has been selected as the formateur. We
50claim that, forming a consensus government is a strictly dominated strategy for party
a; regardless of the values of ￿ and m:







a (Ha (ab)) ￿ U
b (z):












The reservation value of any party i given the initial status quo z is calculated as






: Note that W a (ab;z) and W a (abc;z) are functions of ￿ and m:





; W a (ab;z)￿W a (abc;z) > 0.
This proceeds with three cases: (1) ￿ 2 [0;￿











Consider the ￿rst case. By Proposition 2, Ha (abc) = z: Therefore, W a (abc;z) =







: The joint period-one utility of
















Given Ha (ab) as the period-two status quo, with probability 1￿m
2 ; formateur a forms




















In that case, party b as the period-two out party derives a utility of ub (Ha (ab)) = ￿3
4:
51The situation is symmetric if b is the period-two formateur. With probability m,
party c as formatuer forms a majoritarian government with either a or b and the joint
period-two utility of parties a and b is equal to
u












































If the period-two status quo is z; by symmetry, the joint continuation value of parties




i (z) = 2
3:




















which is purely algebra. Calculations for the Cases (2) and (3) can be done in the
same way. See Figure 7 for an illustration of W a (ab;z) ￿ W a (abc;z) for m = 10%:
Therefore, regardless of the parameter values and given that q0 = z; party a as
formateur will not form a consensus government in the ￿rst period: By symmetry, no
party as period-one formateur will form a consensus government. As a consequence,
given that a minority parliament is elected, no matter how seat shares are distributed,
some majoritarian government forms in period one with an extreme policy that falls
outside the stage game Pareto set of the parties. To show that any period-one electoral
equilibrium must lead to a minority parliament, the proof of Proposition 4 in Baron

















Figure 7: The di⁄erence of two-period utilities of party a derived from forming ma-
joritarian government ab and a consensus government, given m = 10%:
and Diermeier (2001) applies, with the parties￿utility functions replaced by Ua; Ub;
and Uc:
Finally, two observations allow us to generalize the result to any initial status quo
q0 su¢ ciently close to z: First, for any i 2 fa;b;cg and any coalition C ￿ fa;b;cg
such that i 2 C; W i (C;q0) is continuous in q0; holding ￿ and m constant. Second,
for any distinct i;j 2 fa;b;cg; W i (ij;z) ￿ W i (abc;z) is strictly positive, holding ￿
and m constant.
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